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ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Is the defendant entitled to a new trial because trial counsel failed to remove a 
member of the jury who expressed actual bias? 
The standard of review for failure to remove a juror who expressed actual bias is 
abuse of discretion. State v. King, 2008 UT 54, \ 12, 190 P.3d 1283 (Utah 2008). 
2. Did the defendant receive ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel 
failed to remove two members of the jury who expressed potential bias, either by 
challenging them for cause or using a preemptory challenge? 
The standard of review for failure to remove a juror who expressed potential bias 
is plain error where the defendant failed to object for cause during voir dire. Id 
3. Did Smith receive ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel effectively 
conceded the defendant's guilt in closing argument? 
It is a matter of law whether defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of 
counsel. State v. EUifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App.1992). 
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it failed to remove a member of the 
jury who expressed actual bias and failed to rehabilitate a juror who expressed potential 
bias? 
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The standard of review for failure to remove a juror who expressed actual bias is 
abuse of discretion and the standard of review for failure to remove a juror who 
expressed potential bias is plain error. State v. King, 2008 UT 54, ^  12, 190 P.3d 1283 
(Utah2008). 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The defendant, Gary Smith, was charged with two counts of Aggravated Robbery, 
Count 3, Criminal Mischief; Count 4, Burglary; Count 5, Theft; Count 6, Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon by a Category II Restricted Person; Count 7, Engaging in Conduct 
Likely to Harm a Police Service Dog, Counts 8 and 9, Burglary of a Vehicle, Count 10, 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and Count 11, Interference with an Arresting Officer. 
(R. 1-3). After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of all counts except Count 7, 
Engaging in Conduct Likely to Harm a Police Service Dog, of which he was acquitted. 
(R.76-86). 
The defendant was sentenced to five years to life on counts 1 and 2, each to run 
consecutive to the other; one to fifteen years on count 3 and count 5; zero to five years on 
count 4, one year each on count 6, count 8, and count 9, six months each on count 10 and 
count 11, with counts 2 through 11 to run concurrent. (R. 90-93). Smith appealed. (R. 
95-96). Trial counsel filed a brief and the State filed a Motion to Strike Appellant's 
Brief, Discharge Counsel, and Appoint Qualified Appellate Counsel under Rule 38B of 
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STATEMENT OF THE FA<' IS 
...,..> . - • II iimu.ii'N 10th 2009, his propertj in'l lephiw as 
I a i t'lo • and several items were taken including a Jeep that belonged to his dai lghter 
and the keys to some vehicles he stored there. (R.1 ](K Ii"'1, <>• \l- Mark lesliik <" ih,n 
began driving out to examine the prop. • * • mill emu Simula^ , laniiary 1 Xth, 
'ieeu a truck was nut in the area where he had left it. 
. \M4.i. 7). He testified that checked out his property and found damage to a bus 
and a boat. (Id, 150, 1-16). The dump truck had been mo\ed, di\d (heie v\ as a, iieil \r*,iiiiioIc 
that did not belong to unit paikiot HIM<1, li i""!.!"'.. ii oa is2>)) He 
diseo\ eivnl extensive damage to a smalici ous where a miaowa\e , I)VD playei " C R 
player and stereo tuner had been ripped out. 7o 15"\ 6»^°: 1 ^ > \ Te removed ,: e 
keys from, his dump truck that vva^  bio . * *' th.- vd 
\ I'liiiii oiniifo i i in i|»l<" in i«\i( flie b - ' • I'** M. Mr. Sudweeks ttsutied that 
as he turned to leave, Mr. Smith approached him with a machete over his head and. 
d :haf !k; tiiu; ]*I'v the key or he vould kill ; ew the 
• * • ,• i k , s i , O w l , :\^ i ^ *veeks 
tiH •!*••• i tb^t x nerand demanded that she give him her cell phone or he 
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would kill her. {Id., 217, 20-25). Mark Sudweeks testified that Mr. Smith moved the 
dump truck and drove the red car out of the building but it appeared to get stuck in the 
snow. {Id. 169, 6-170, 15). Officer Thompson testified that when he arrived at the scene 
he found Mr. Smith on the property hiding in some bushes and holding a knife in his 
hand. {Id., 62, 1-11; 67, 7-9). The Officer testified that he found a metal cigarette on Mr. 
Smith that smelled like marijuana. {Id. 71, 3-72, 5). The officer also testified that he 
found a "meth pipe" in the glove box of the red car in the bam. {Id., 82, 8 - 83, 21). Mr. 
Smith was placed under arrest and was charged with eleven counts including Aggravated 
Robbery, Criminal Mischief, and Burglary.. (R. 1-3). The case went to trial on June 30, 
2009. 
The court summoned a jury pool of 30 persons. During voir dire, the Court asked 
the jurors several questions including whether any members of the jury pool were 
acquainted with members of the prosecution. (R. 116, 15, 3-5). Juror Kevin Ockey, 
informed the Court that he served in a church calling with Perry Davis, one of the deputy 
county attorney's from the Juab County Attorney's Office. (R. 116; 15, 6-7). In 
response to the Court's inquiry whether that relationship would impact his ability to be 
fair and impartial Juror Ockey responded "No." {Id. 8-11). Juror Ockey also informed 
the Court that defense counsel was a client of his insurance agency. {Id. ;18, 24, - 19, 2). 
In response to the Court's inquiry whether that relationship would impact his ability to be 
A 
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fair and impartial Mr. Ockey responded "No." (Id; 19,3-6). 
Several members of the jury had close relatives in law enforcement. Frank 
Riding's brother was a deputy in Utah County (Id.; 24, 16-17); Daniel Firkus had a 
brother-in-law going through the police academy (Id.; 24, 24-25); Christine Blackhurst's 
brother-in-law was a highway patrolman in California (Id.; 25,19-20); and Michelle 
Stephenson's ex-boyfriend, and the father of her children, was an officer at the Utah 
County Jail. (Id. 27, 22 - 28, 12). In response to the Court's inquiry whether the fact that 
they had family members employed in law enforcement would cause them to give more 
or less weight to the testimony of a peace officer than anyone else that that might testify 
in the trial, each of the jurors responded "No." (R. 116: page 24, 11 - page 28, 15). 
In response to the Court's inquiry whether they had close relationships with other 
members of the jury which may cause they to give more or less weight to the opinion of 
someone else that might serve on the jury with them, Juror Firkus informed the Court that 
Juror Ockey, was his Bishop and that he valued his opinion although he did not think it 
would really make a difference in the case. (Id.; 29, 7-9). The Court began to question 
Juror Firkus concerning his potential bias but the Court was interrupted by Juror Ockey 
and never completed the question. Juror Firkus never stated unequivocally that he would 
not be prejudiced by the association and both he and Juror Ockey were ultimately 
empaneled on the jury; 
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MR. FIRKUS: Well, Kevin is my bishop, so I do value his opinion, but I 
don't think it would really make a difference that way in this case. 
THE COURT: Okay. So Mr. Ockey is your ecclesiastical leader, but you 
don't - - although you value his opinion, you think you could 
MR. OCKEY: He never listens to me. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else? How about you, Mr. Ockey? (Id; 
29,10-15). 
The Court had the jurors complete a questionnaire of 22 questions which included 
questions concerning personal information, whether they could read and write English; 
their citizenship; if they could weight the evidence fairly and without prejudice; if they 
would follow the instructions provided by the court; if there was any reason why they 
could not be a fair and impartial juror or if there were any reasons or hardships why they 
could not serve as a juror. (R. jury questionnaires). After receiving the responses and 
giving the parties time to process them, the trial judge brought counsel into chambers and 
they discussed which jurors should be removed for cause. (R. 116, 32-37). The Court 
and counsel stipulated to strike several jurors for cause including Donna Jones who 
attended the same church as the victims; Mr. Evans, a police officer for the state parks 
who worked closely with the County Attorney's Office; Mr. Carter who had close 
association with everyone and Leonard Trauntvein who had a daughter that worked for 
the County Attorney's Office. (Id). Trial counsel did not request that the Court question 
any of the potential jurors concerning bias. (Id.; 32, 9—37,7). 
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Counsel for the State, Jared Eldridge, asked to question Christine Blackhurst 
concerning her answer to question number 21; "Are there any other reasons why you 
could not be a fair and impartial juror in this case? Please explain:" (R.jury 
questionnaires, 12). Juror Blackhurst had stated; "I do teach FHE every Monday night at 
the Juab Co. Jail. I don't know if that would be a problem in this case" (Id): 
MR. ELDRIDGE: You know, Christine Blackhurst, I kind of wanted to ask her 
a question. She indicated she does family home evening out at the jail, and I just 
wondered if - - she didn't indicate that she knew defendant, but I just wondered if 
she sat on this jury and found him guilty if that was going to make her 
uncomfortable out there at the jail. 
THE COURT: Do you want her brought in? 
THE COURT: Yeah, why don't you move (inaudible). 
MR.ELDRIDGE: I'll just shift down one. 
(Ms. Blackhurst enters chambers) 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Hi there. Are you nervous? 
MS. BLACKHURST: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Ms. Blackhurst, you indicated in your questionnaire that you 
conducted family home evenings out at the jail. 
MS. BLACKHURST: Uh-huh. 
THE COURT: Mr. Eldridge might have had a question for you. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Right. I was just - - you don't know this particular defendant 
in your involvement out there; is that right? 
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MS. BLACKHURST: I - -
MR.ELDRIDGE: Youjust don't know? 
MS. BLACKHURST: I don't know him. I --
MR.ELDRIDGE: Okay. 
MS. BLACKHURST: I'm not sure if he came one time or not, and that's the 
only thing of- -
MR. ELDRIDGE: My question is is (sic) if you sat on this jury and the evidence 
was such that you thought that he was guilty and you found him guilty, would that 
make you uncomfortable out there at the jail working with the people that you 
work with? 
MS. BLACKHURST: I don't think so. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: That was my question. 
MS. BLACKHURST: Okay 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Harmon? , 
MR. HARMON: No. (R. 116, 32, 24-34, 11). 
Although Juror Blackhurst, answered "no" to question number 19; "Do you feel that you 
can weigh the evidence fairly and without prejudice?" trial counsel did not ask Juror 
Blackhurst any questions, nor did he ask the Court to rehabilitate her concerning her 
responses on the juror questionnaire. (R. Juror questionnaires, no 12). No further 
questions were addressed to Juror Blackhurst by either trial counsel or the Court 
concerning her answer that she could not weight the evidence fairly and without 
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prejudice. Jurors Blackhurst, Firkus and Ockey all served on the jury together with 
Jurors Riding, Stephenson, Miller, Whiting, and Stephensen. Trial counsel passed the 
jury. (Id; 37,7). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in this case as he failed to 
challenge a juror who had expressed actual bias, failed to challenge two jurors who had 
expressed implied bias, failed to subject the State's case to an aggressive testing and 
conceded the defendant's guilt during closing argument. Prejudice can be presumed 
because one member of the jury expressed actual bias and the State's case was not 
subjected to the adversarial testing required by the Sixth Amendment right to effective 
assistance of counsel. The trial court erred by failing to ensure that the defendant was 
judged by a fair and impartial jury. 
Even if the Court should find that the juror's expressed bias was not sufficient to rise 
to the level of actual bias, the cumulative effect of the several errors by trial counsel in 
selecting the jury and throughout the trial demonstrates that Mr. Smith did not receive a 
fair trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL BY FAILING TO ENSURE THAT THE JURY WAS 
IMPARTIAL 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel 
rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998); see also Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). There is generally also a second requirement 
that the defendant demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for the deficient conduct 
he would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 
644 (Utah 1996). However there are some situations where trial counsel's performance is 
such that the Court has found that prejudice can be presumed as the defendant has been 
denied his basic sixth amendment rights that make the adversary process itself 
presumptively unreliable. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). 
1. Prejudice under Strickland is presumed when a biased juror is impaneled and a 
new trial is required. 
In United States v. Cronic, decided the same day as Strickland, the Court explained 
that when circumstances are so likely to prejudice the defendant, the cost of litigating 
their effect is unjustified, and prejudice can be presumed. 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). A 
defendant is spared the need to show probable effect upon the outcome, and simply 
presume such effect, where assistance of counsel is denied during a critical stage of the 
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proceeding. Strickland 466 U.S. at 692; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (UT 
1994). "When that has occurred, the likelihood that the verdict is unreliable is so high 
that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 
(2002). Whether a litigant is required to show actual prejudice or whether prejudice is 
instead presumed "turns on the magnitude of the deprivation of the right to effective 
assistance of counsel." Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, If 100, 150 P.3d 480. One of the 
areas recognized by the Courts where prejudice can be presumed is when a defendant has 
established that a member of the jury has exhibited actual bias. State v. King, (King IV) 
2008 UT 54, TI28, Tl 36, 190 P.3d 1283 (Utah 2008). 
The seating of a biased juror who should have been dismissed for cause requires 
reversal of the conviction. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 (2000). 
The question of whether to seat a biased juror is not a discretionary or strategic decision. 
United States v. Hughes, 258 F.3d 453, 463 (6th Cir.2001). "When trial counsel impanels 
a biased juror, prejudice under Strickland is presumed, and a new trial is required." 
Miller v. Webb, 385 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2004). The "presence of a biased juror cannot be 
harmless; the error requires a new trial without a showing of actual prejudice." United 
States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). 
The question of whether to seat a biased juror is not a discretionary or strategic 
decision as it undermines the fairness and impartiality of the verdict. A defendant who is 
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convicted of a crime by a jury comprised of even one member who has exhibited actual 
bias is entitled to a new trial as it is the only way to assure that a defendant's rights under 
the Sixth Amendment are preserved. 
2. Actual bias can be demonstrated by an express admission of bias during voir dire 
"Actual bias is 'bias in facf-the existence of a state of mind that leads to an 
inference that the person will not act with entire impartiality." United States v. Torres, 
128 F.3d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1997)(citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936;/ 
Actual prejudice is demonstrated when a juror makes a "clear declaration that she did not 
think she could be a fair juror." United States v. Hughes, 258 F.3d 453, 458 (6th 
Cir.2001). 
In Hughes, the Sixth Circuit found that a juror had expressed actual bias and the 
defendant had to receive a new trial as prejudice was presumed. Id. During voir dire, the 
trial judge asked potential jurors whether they thought they could be fair. Id. 258 F.3d at 
456. In response, one of the jurors indicated that she had a nephew on the police force, 
was familiar with several detectives and stated: "I don't think I could be fair." Id. Neither 
the court nor trial counsel asked the potential juror any follow-up questions, and "failed 
to conduct the most rudimentary inquiry of the potential juror to inquire further into her 
statement that she could not be fair." Id. at 458-459. The Sixth Circuit found that juror 
bias can always be presumed from such an unequivocal statement. Id. at 460. The Court 
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also found that a failure of trial counsel to respond to a prospective juror's express 
admission of bias on voir dire, was a failure to exercise the customary skill and diligence 
that a reasonably competent attorney would provide. Id. at 754. 
In another case the Sixth Circuit Court ruled that prejudice could be presumed in a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel failed to challenge for cause 
a juror who knew a witness and had expressed sympathy for her. Miller v. Webb, 385 
F.3d 666 (2004). The Court ruled that the presence of a biased juror could not be 
harmless. Id. at 678. During voir dire, a juror stated that she knew the state's key witness 
who was the only eyewitness to the crime and who had also been shot. Id. at 668. The 
juror explained that she knew the witness through her ministry and Bible Study Group in 
the local jail. Id. She stated she would be "partial" to the witness and had sympathy for 
her. Id. at 668-669. While she stated that she "believed" she could be fair, she qualified 
this by stating, "I do have some feelings about her." Id. at 669. Counsel did not follow-
up with questions or challenge the juror. Id. The Court found that "the decision whether 
to seat a biased juror cannot be a discretionary or strategic decision" because it amounts 
to "a waiver of a defendant's basic Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury." 
/</. at 675-676. 
The selection of an impartial jury depends heavily upon counsel's participation 
and vigilance in detecting possible biases. A defendant may rebut the presumption that 
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their trial counsel's decisions in choosing a jury were the result of plausibly justifiable 
conscious choices. The defendant needs to show that trial counsel was so inattentive 
during the jury selection process that he failed to remove a prospective juror who had 
expressed a bias so strong or unequivocal that no plausibly countervailing subjective 
preference could justify failure to remove that juror. See Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, <J 
25, 156 P. 3d 739 (Utah 2007). Trial counsel in this case failed to uphold the defendant's 
right to trial by an impartial jury by failing to follow-up on the actual bias expressed by 
one jury member and the potential bias of several other members of the jury. 
3. Juror Blackhurst expressed actual bias and should have been removed from the 
jury 
Evaluating trial counsel's jury selection decisions can be a speculative exercise; 
however, the key facts are easily discernible in relation to Juror Blackhurst in this case. 
On her questionnaire, Juror Blackhurst took the unusual step of expressly stating an 
inability to weigh the evidence without prejudice when she answered "no" to question 
number 19; "Do you feel that you can weigh the evidence fairly and without prejudice?'9 
(R. Juror questionnaire, no. 12). Even when Juror Blackhurst was brought into chambers 
to be questioned by the State concerning her written answer to question number 21, trial 
counsel still did not ask her any questions concerning her negative reply to question 19. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Right. I was just - - you don't know this particular defendant 
in your involvement out there; is that right? 
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MS. BLACKHURST: I - -
MR.ELDRIDGE: Youjust don't know? 
MS. BLACKHURST: I don't know him. I - -
MR.ELDRIDGE: Okay. 
MS. BLACKHURST: I'm not sure if he came one time or not, and that's the 
only thing of- -
MR. ELDRIDGE: My question is is (sic) if you sat on this jury and the evidence 
was such that you thought that he was guilty and you found him guilty, would that 
make you uncomfortable out there at the jail working with the people that you 
work with? 
MS. BLACKHURST: I don't think so. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: That was my question. 
MS. BLACKHURST: Okay 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Harmon? 
MR.HARMON: No. (116; 33, 19- 34, 11). 
A clear expression of an inability to weight the evidence "fairly and without 
prejudice" is an unusual enough occurrence injury selection to generally attract the 
attention of trial counsel if they are diligent and attentive. Throughout voir dire in this 
case, when given the opportunity, trial counsel did not ask any questions to collect 
information about any of the prospective jurors. Although Juror Blackhurst expressed 
her bias so unequivocal that no plausible countervailing subjective preference could 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
justify failure to remove her, trial counsel did not challenge her for cause or use a 
preemptory challenge to remove her from the jury. 
Juror Blackhurst meets the definition of a biased juror as she admitted in her 
questionnaire that she could not weight the evidence fairly and without prejudice and she 
was never rehabilitated as to this admission. Since seating a biased juror cannot be a 
discretionary or strategic decision because it amounts to a waiver of a defendant's basic 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury, trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel. He failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a 
reasonably competent attorney would provide. As Juror Blackhurst admitted that she 
could not act with entire impartiality, actual prejudice is presumed, and the requirements 
of Strickland and Cronic have been met. 
4. Juror Firkus and Juror Ocker expressed an implied bias and should have been 
removed from the jury 
To establish that trial counsel was inattentive, a defendant must demonstrate either 
"a specific and clear example of inattentiveness that directly caused the failure to object 
to a particular juror, or else show that counsel generally failed to participate in a 
meaningful way in the process as a whole.'1 State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, 153 
P.3d 804 (2006)(quoting at State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,120, 12 P.3d 92). Justice 
O'Connor has given some examples of situations where bias may be presumed: "a 
revelation that the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the 
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criminal transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal 
transaction." Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222 (1982) (concurring opinion). Justice 
O'Connor explained that seating close relatives of the prosecutor on the jury would 
introduce "an extraneous influence that could color the deliberations" as it would be 
highly unlikely that an individual could remain impartial and objective when a blood 
relative has a stake in the outcome. Id. "The juror in question would be lacking the 
quality of indifference which, along with impartiality, is the hallmark of an unbiased 
juror." Id. 
In addition to failing to notice that Juror Blackhurst had expressed an inability to hear 
the case without prejudice, trial counsel was also ineffective by failing to question either 
Juror Firkus or Juror Ockey concerning undue influence in the jury after Juror Firkus 
disclosed to the Court that Juror Kevin Ockey was in a fiduciary position over him as his 
religious leader. The record indicates that trial counsel was completely inattentive to the 
answers the jurors were giving during voir dire, particularly Juror Firkus. Trial counsel 
failed to note that Juror Firkus failed to answer the Court's question concerning whether 
he could express his own opinion as to the case and not give any more weight to 
someone's else's opinion. 
MR. FIRKUS; Well, Kevin is my bishop, so I do value his opinion, but I 
don't think it would really make a difference that way in this case. 
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THE COURT; Okay. So Mr. Ockey is your ecclesiastical leader, but you 
don't - - although you value his opinion, you think you could 
MR. OCKEY: He never listens to me. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else. How about you Mr. Ockey. 
Juror Ockey further revealed that many of the potential jurors were his business 
associates or long time acquaintances, demonstrating that he had a potential for influence 
on many of the jury members. (R., 29, 16-18). When the Court further questioned 
whether any of those relationships came together socially or anything, Juror Ockey's 
answer was somewhat evasive: 
MR. OCKEY: There's plenty in this room that either I associate with 
through my business or been long time acquaintances, lived - - growing up and living in 
this community. 
THE COURT: Anyone that has a strong relationship that you come together 
socially or anything? 
MR.OCKEY: No, not really, yes. 
THE COURT: You don't think there's any relationship such that 
MR. OCKEY: Would affect me, no, sir. (R. 116, 29, 7-24). 
Trial counsel was ineffective and inattentive by failing to notice that the Court's 
question concerning the potential for undue influence addressed to Juror Ferkus was 
answered by Juror Ockey and Juror Firkus failed to answer the question. Had trial 
counsel been attentive or actively engaged in the selection process, he would have noted 
the Court's oversight and given the Court an opportunity to correct it when the parties Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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retired to chambers. However trial counsel did not request any further query concerning 
the potential bias and appeared to be totally unaware that Juror Firkus had never been 
rehabilitated. The only challenge for cause trial counsel made on his own initiative was 
for Mr. Hall who indicated that he had a funeral to arrange. (R. 116, 35, 11-12). All 
other challenges were suggested by the Court or the State. (Id. 32-36). In chambers trial 
counsel's discussion on removing potential jurors for cause focused more on his concern 
for the potential members of the jury than on his role as trial counsel for the defendant. 
(R. 116, 35, 12- 36, 9). Effective trial counsel must investigate juror bias through facts, 
not speculation. Juror Kevin Ockey had informed the court that he served in a close 
religious position with the deputy attorney for Juab County, he was the ecclesiastical 
leader of Juror Firkus and that he was closely acquainted with most of the members of the 
jury pool through his business. The fact that Juror Ockey was elected to be the jury 
foreman lends credibility to his claim that he was close to most of the members of the 
jury pool. Trial counsel did not ask Juror Firkus any further questions concerning 
whether or not he would be influenced by having his ecclesiastical leader serve on the 
same jury with him or whether he felt like his decision making process would be affected 
by his connection to the bishop. He did not ask Juror Ockey any further questions 
concerning his relationship to Perry Davis, one of the prosecutor's from the county 
attorney's office, how long he had known him or the nature of the church calling they had 
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served in together. (R. 116, 15, 6-11). Although Juror Ockey had expressed that his 
relationship with Mr. Davis would not impact his ability to be fair and impartial, jurors 
are not always the best judge of how their relationships will impact their decision making 
process. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to ask Juror 
Ockey questions specifically relating to his ability to be fair in light of his working 
relationship with one of the prosecutors; by failing to question Juror Firkus concerning 
his close relationship with Juror Ockey and because he failed to even raise the issue of 
challenging them for cause or removing them from the jury by means of his preemptory 
challenges. Trial counsel was so inattentive or indifferent that the failure to remove the 
jurors was not the product of a conscious choice or preference, but rather that he went 
along with whatever the Court and the State suggested. 
II. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHEN HE FAILED TO 
SUBJECT THE STATE'S CASE TO A MEANINGFUL TEST AND 
WHEN HE CONCEDED SMITH'S GUILT IN CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
Trial counsel must subject the prosecution's case to adversarial challenge in order 
to ensure that the accused receives the effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment. To be effective, an attorney "must play the role of an active 
advocate, rather than a mere friend of the court." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 
(1985). If the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the 
constitutional guarantee is violated. "[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the 
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prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth 
Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. Unless an attorney represents the interests of a client with zeal 
and loyalty, the adversarial system of justice cannot operate. State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 
357, 359 (Utah 1994)(citing Cronic 466 U.S. at 656-57). A Court can presume that 
ineffective assistance of counsel was prejudicial when trial counsel entirely "fails to 
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Kelt v. State, 2008 UT 
62, f 32, 194 P.3d 913 (Utah 2008). (Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659). 
Trial counsel did not subject the State's case to the adversarial challenge necessary 
to guarantee Smith's right to a fair trial. Although he subjected the State's witnesses to 
cross- examination, his representation fell below the standard required from competent 
counsel. He failed to raise numerous objections, he did not require the State to meet its 
burden of proof with regards to the alleged paraphernalia that was found on Mr. Smith or 
his possession or ownership of the red vehicle located inside the bam and in closing 
argument he conceded Smith's guilt. 
The State must introduce evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged 
crime. See State v. Smith, 927 P.2d 649, 651 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Trial counsel failed to object when Officer Thompson discussed a key piece of 
evidence he claimed to have located on Mr. Smith's person that linked Smith to 
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ownership of the red car located inside the barn even though the document was not 
produced at trial. Under Rule 1002 of the Utah Rules of Evidence the document needed 
to be produced in court and put into evidence in order to be presented to the jury. 
MR. ELDRIDGE: Okay. During your investigation were you ever able to find 
who the owner of this vehicle was? 
OFFICER THOMPSON: Not necessarily. He had in his possession just a piece 
of paper like a legal pad like you guys are writing on, he'd ripped off the corner and it 
said, "I so-and-so sell this Pathfinder to Mr. Smith for" - 1 can't remember, a hundred 
bucks or something. It wasn't a lot. I can't remember what it was. We ran the - - it had 
a temporary plate on the back, and the name on his bill of sale, I guess, was the same 
name that came back to the temporary stickers on it, and I've never been able to locate 
him yet, or find a registered owner. 
Q. So you indicate you found a piece of paper or a writing in the 
possession of the defendant; is that right? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. Do we have that? 
A. I'm not sure where it is. I think it got sealed. I think it actually was 
left in the glove box or something so we wouldn't lose it at the time. I can't remember if 
we got it into evidence or not, because I was still doing research and searching trying to 
find that other person. 
MR. ELDREDGE: All right. I think those are all the questions that I'm going 
to ask Officer Thompson at this time. (R. 116, 103, 24 - 104, 16). 
Trial counsel also failed to object when Officer Thompson estimated the damage to the 
property, an element of Count 3, Criminal Mischief, even though the Officer was not 
qualified as an expert and clearly stated that he was in no way a professional estimator 
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and that there was so much damage he could not give a good estimate. (Id. 134, 11-135, 
2). Under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, if specialized knowledge will assist 
the jury to understand the evidence, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Although Officer Thompson claimed that as a police officer he made estimations of 
damage to property, trial counsel did not object or raise any question concerning his 
training or experience that qualified him to make estimations of damage to property, 
vehicles or electronic equipment. 
Trial counsel also permitted the Officer to testify, without objection, that the pipe 
located in the vehicle contained meth and the metal cigarette found on Mr. Smith's 
person contained marijuana. (R. 116, 71, 1-72, 5). He did not require the State to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the grain that the officer described as "burnt tobacco" was 
marijuana by introducing any tests performed at the State Lab by experts, but rather 
permitted the Officer to testify as an expert based only on his sense of smell. Id. Trial 
counsel further permitted the Officer to testify without objection, that the pipe he located 
in the glove compartment of the red vehicle was a "meth pipe." This was based solely on 
the Officer's experience of seeing other similar pipes that had been used to smoke meth. 
(Id. 83, 9-25). Trial counsel permitted the pipe to be published to the jury as Exhibit 9 
without requiring any testing of the pipe for residue by an expert. Id. 
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Before trial Smith had entered not guilty pleas to all eleven (11) charges against 
him. (R. 22). In closing argument, trial counsel asked the jury to find his client guilty of 
Criminal Mischief and conceded that Smith had committed burglary and theft: 
Sometimes we can't discover truth. What you've got to do is do 
the best you can with the evidence that's been presented to you. What 
we would do is ask you to find Mr. Smith guilty, but just of the 3rd 
Degree Felony, and I think the best one is the criminal mischief charge. 
It seems to me like many of the burglary charges and the theft 
charges and all that tie in with - •• mostly with the criminal mischief 
because as the items are taken out and they're saying there was all this 
damage done when that occurred, it seems like that all ought to be part 
of that. That's what he's asking that he be found guilty of that charge 
of criminal mischief and not these other charges. That's the position 
that he takes, and that's the request that he makes of you today. 
Thank you. (R. 117, 163,7-20). 
By conceding at least partial guilt in the closing argument trial counsel overrode Smith's 
plea of not guilty and made what was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. Even if 
trial counsel thought the evidence was so overwhelming that a plea of guilty to the lesser 
charge of criminal mischief was the best trial strategy, he could not do so without his 
client's express consent. When trial counsel admitted Smith's guilt in closing argument, 
Smith's rights to a fair trial and to put the State to the burden of proof were denied. 
Prejudice should be presumed in this case because failure to submit the prosecution's 
charges to adversarial testing is a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENSURE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT 
TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY 
Even when trial counsel fails to raise a for-cause challenge to a prospective juror, 
a trial court has a duty to further investigate or remove the juror sua sponte if he or she 
has ,fexpress[ed] a bias or conflict of interest so strong or unequivocal as to inevitably 
taint the trial process." State v. King, (King II) 2006 UT 3, f 19, 131 P.3d 202 (UT 
2006)(quoting State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 32, 12 P.3d 92 (Utah 2000)). "Once 
statements are made during voir dire that' facially raise a question of partiality or 
prejudice, an abuse of discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is removed by the 
court or unless the court or counsel investigates further and finds the inference rebutted.5" 
State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, |27, 24 P.3d 948 (Utah 2001) (quoting State v Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988). Once strong feelings of actual bias are revealed "a 
prospective juror may not sit, even if the prospective juror later asserts that he or she can 
render an impartial verdict." State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 449 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(Bench, J., dissenting). ff[W]hen a juror has expressed an attitude indicating prejudice or 
bias, such cannot be attenuated by the juror's determination that he can render an 
impartial verdict. The juror cannot be the judge of his qualifications; this function is the 
responsibility of the trial court." State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981). 
Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the 
evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. Smith v. Phillips, 455 US 
209, 217 (1982). More is at stake than the rights of petitioner; "justice must satisfy the 
appearance of justice." Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
The Court's failure to note that Juror Blackhurst had answered on her 
questionnaire that she could not weigh the evidence fairly and without prejudice meant 
that defendant was denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury. (R. Juror 
questionnaire, no. 12). Once Juror Firkus informed the Court during voir dire that one of 
the other jurors was his ecclesiastical leader, a question of partiality or prejudice was 
raised. The Court abused its discretion by permitting Juror Ockey, the religious leader, to 
answer on behalf of Juror Firkus. By failing to follow up on the question to Juror Firkus 
concerning whether he could express his own opinion as to the case and not give any 
more weight to someone's else's opinion, the Court failed to rehabilitate Juror Firkus. 
IV. THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE NUMEROUS ERRORS WAS 
HARMFUL TO DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL 
Even if no harm was caused by the trial council's errors individually, the combined 
effect of those errors was so harmful that Mr. Smith's conviction should be reversed 
under the cumulative error doctrine. Under the cumulative error doctrine, the Court 
should reverse a verdict if "the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our 
confidence ... that a fair trial was had." Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp., 801 
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P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989). 
In assessing a claim of cumulative error, the Court should consider all the identified 
errors, as well as any errors the Court assumes may have occurred. State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993). 
Trial counsel's failure to ensure an impartial jury by permitting one juror who had 
expressed actual bias and one juror who had implied a bias to sit on the jury combined 
with his failure to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing and his 
concession during closing argument that his client was guilty, taken together, resulted in 
the defendant being denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests that this Court find 
that the errors committed by the trial court were prejudicial to the defendant's right to a 
fair trial and reverse and remand for a new trial. 
DATED | U August 2011. 
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ANNP. BOYLE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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U. S. CONST. AMEND. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
UTAH CONST. ART. I, SEC. 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided 
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as 
defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for expert 
testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles or methods underlying the 
testimony meet a threshold showing that they (i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon 
sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have been reliably applied to the facts of the case. 
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the principles or 
methods on which such knowledge is based, including the sufficiency of facts or data and 
the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by the 
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Rule 1002. Requirement of original. 
To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, 
recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by 
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of this State or by Statute. 
Rule 1004. Admissibility of other evidence of contents. 
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a writing, recording, or 
photograph is admissible if: 
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the 
proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith; or 
(2) Original not obtainable. No original can be obtained by any available judicial process 
or procedure; or 
(3) Original in possession of opponent. At a time when an original was under the control 
of the party against whom offered, that party was put on notice, by the pleadings or 
otherwise, that the content would be a subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does 
not produce the original at the hearing; or 
(4) Collateral matters. The writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a 
controlling issue. 
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